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MR.  RUSSELL:  Good  afternoon,  everyone.  Welcome  to  what  is  the  final  session 
of  this  wonderful  conference.  It  has  been  a  really  great  one,  and  what  a  great  way  to  put  a 
bow  on  this  year’s  Fordham  IP  Conference  with  this  exquisite  panel.  This  is,  of  course, 
fair  use. 
In  terms  of  structure,  we  have  a  lot  of  ground  to  cover  and  not  much  time  to  do  it. 
I’m  hoping  to  cover  four  basic  areas  of  fair  use  today: 
(1)  Fair  use  and  transformativeness; 
(2)  Fair  use,  functionality,  and  other  limiting  aspects  of  copyright; 
(3)  Fair  use  and  what  I  also  call  “Is  it  spreading?”  —  global  perspectives; 
(4)  Taking  a  step  back  and  looking  at  the  things  we  have  discussed  from  a 
broader  population  perspective,  practical  considerations,  if  we  have  time,  to  sum  up.  Oh, 
the  places  we’ll  boldly  go!  
But  we’ll  first  go  where  many  have  gone  before  with  transformativeness  in  these 
types  of  panels  and  in  courts  and  also  at  cocktail  parties.  Without  further  ado,  Judge 
Leval,  do  you  want  to  kick  us  off? 
JUDGE  LEVAL:  Thank  you.  I  am  going  to  talk  briefly  about  two  recent  Second 
Circuit  cases  which  I  think  have  contributed  significantly  to  the  understanding  of  fair  use, 
TCA  Television  v.  McCollum   and  Fox  News  v.  TVEyes . 
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TCA involved  the  copying  of  Abbott  and  Costello’s  famous,  riotously  funny 
Who’s  on  First?  routine.  If  anybody  doesn’t  know  about  it,  it  is  a  side-splittingly  funny, 
adored  chestnut  of  American  humor.  
The  plaintiffs  were  the  Abbott  and  Costello  heirs.  The  defendants  were  the  writer 
and  producers  of  a  new  play  entitled  Hand  to  God . 
In  the  play,  the  protagonist  (Jason),  trying  to  make  tracks  with  a  girl  (Jessica), 
engages  with  his  hand  puppet  in  a  dialogue  that  reproduces  the  Abbott  and  Costello 
Who’s  on  First?  routine.  The  audience,  of  course,  laughs,  and  Jessica  is  impressed.  She 
says,  “That’s  really  good.  Did  you  make  that  up  by  yourself?”  He  says,  “Yes,”  whereupon 
the  puppet  intervenes,  “Liar,”  and  Jason  then  fesses  up. 
The  defendants  contended  that  their  appropriation  was  fair  use.  It  was 
transformative,  they  argued,  in  that  it  drove  the  character  development  and  the 
complexity  of  the  relationships.  They  also  contended  that  the  appropriation 
communicated a  dark  view  of  the  mores  of  contemporary  society .  I  find  it’s  not  unusual 
for  appropriators  to  argue  validation  on  the  ground  that  the  appropriation  communicates  a 
dark  view  of  the  mores  of  contemporary  society. 
The  district  court  found  fair  use,  but  the  court  of  appeals  was  not  buying  it.  The 
extensive  copying  milks  the  very  laughs  that  were  the  objective  of  the  original. 
Re-presenting  a  work  to  communicate  the  original  intention  of  the  authors  is  not  a 
transformative  use. 
But  what  about  the  defendant’s  claim  that  the  copying  was  a  transformative 
dynamic  to  develop  the  play’s  plot  and  the  relationships  between  the  characters?  The 
court’s  answer  to  that  contention  I  think  is  a  point  of  major  interest  for  fair  use.  Invoking 
a  standard  that  was  put  forth  in  the  Supreme  Court’s Campbell  opinion,  the  court  noted  
3
1  TCA  Television  Corp.  v.  McCollum,  839  F.3d  168  (2nd  Cir.  2016).   
2  Fox  News  Network,  LLC  v.  TvEyes,  Inc.,  883  F.3d  169  (2nd  Cir.  2018). 
3  Campbell  v.  Acuff-Rose  Music,  Inc.,  510  U.S.  569  (1994). 
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that  the  defendant’s  quotation  of  the  routine  had  “no  critical  bearing”  of  any  kind  on  the 
original,  which  the  play  “merely  use[d]  to  get  attention.” 
This  was  an  important  but  underappreciated  point  in  the  Supreme  Court’s 
Campbell  ruling.  Speaking  of  the  important  difference  between  parody  and  satire, 
Campbell  explained  parody  quotes  from  the  original  in  a  mocking  or  ridiculing  way  to 
communicate  a  critique  of  the  original.  Parody  requires  quotation  to  make  critical  points 
about  the  original,  and  the  commentary  about  the  original  is  the  justification  for  quoting 
it. 
In  contrast,  what  Justice  Souter  referred  to  as  satire  is  taking  from  an  original  to 
make  the  copier’s  independent  point,  which  is  not  about  the  original.  It’s  not  a 
commentary  on  the  original.  Such  an  appropriation  piggybacks  on  the  fame  and  felicity 
of  the  original  to  give  punch  or  humor  to  the  copier’s  message,  and  the  Supreme  Court 
questioned  the  justification  for  such  an  appropriation. 
The Campbell  Court  put  those  observations  in  terms  of  parody  vs.  satire  because 
the  defendant  was  claiming  the  well-established  protective  mantle  of  parody  as  a  fair  use. 
But  the  importance  of  the  observations  goes  way  beyond  the  difference  between  parody 
and  satire.  It  addresses  a  common  form  of  copying  that  is  neither  parodic  nor  satirical, 
where  one  piggybacks  on  a  famous  song,  poem,  passage,  or  logo  —  with  some  changes 
—  playing  on  audience  recognition  of  the  original  to  give  punch  or  humor  to  the  new 
message,  which  otherwise  is  not  in  any  way  a  commentary  on  the  original. 
The TCA  opinion  found  no  justification.  Its  pushing  of  this  important  lesson  from 
Campbell  beyond  parody  vs.  satire  I  think  is  an  important  marker  for  the  understanding 
of  fair  use.  The  takings  most  likely  to  win  the  first  factor  are  those  that  contribute 
something  transformative  about  the  original,  not  those  that  piggyback  on  it. 
Another  valuable  lesson  from  the TCA  opinion  is  its  treatment  of  commercial  use 
by  the  copier.  One  of  the  worst  gaffes  in  the  history  of  fair  use  was  the  Supreme  Court’s 
off-the-cuff  dictum  in Sony  that  commercial  uses  are  “presumptively”  not  fair  uses.  This  
4
made  no  sense  whatsoever.  The  most  universally  agreed,  noncontroversial  examples  of 
fair  use  —  such  as  quotation  in  book  reviews  that  are  published  in  newspapers  that  are 
sold  for  profit,  quotation  of  historical  figures  in  textbooks  —  all  of  that  is  commercial. 
Courts  regularly  ignored  the  confusing,  unhelpful  dictum  from Sony  until  the  Supreme 
Court  essentially  disavowed  it  in  Campbell . 
In TCA  the  issue  arose  in  a  special  light.  The  play’s  repetition  of  the Who’s  on 
First?  routine  had  been  used  not  only  in  the  play  but  in  advertisements  for  the  play.  So, 
while  the  play  itself  was  commercial  in  the  conventional  manner  of  most  published  works 
and  most  fair  uses,  the  use  of  the  copied  routine in  advertising  for  the  play  could  be  said 
to  be  commercial  squared.  The  court  did  not  count  against  fair  use  that  the  play  was 
performed  for  profit,  but  it  did  count  against  fair  use  that  the  display  of  the  copied  routine 
appeared  in  advertising,  which  I  think  is  a  sensible  interpretation  of  the  limited 
significance  of  the  mention  of  commercial  use  in  the  statute’s  first  factor. 
I  turn  to Fox  News  v.  TVEyes ,  which,  to  my  mind,  importantly  clarifies  priorities 
in  fair-use  analysis.  
4  Sony  Corp.  of  America  v.  Universal  City  Studios,  Inc.,  464  U.S.  417  (1984).    
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The  case  involved  what  might  be  called  “technological  transformation.” 
Technological  transformation,  although  not  described  in  anything  like  those  terms, 
entered  the  fair-use  jurisprudence  back  in  the  mid-1980s  with  the  Supreme  Court’s Sony 
decision. Sony  established  that  video  copying  from  a  TV  transmission  could  be  fair  use 
where  a  watcher  who  owned  the  right  to  watch  the  TV  program  taped  it  so  as  to  watch  it 
once  at  a  more  convenient  time.  
Back  then,  when  fair  use  was  generally  viewed  as  critical  commentary  or  parody, 
a  finding  of  fair  use  based  on  a  copying  that  neither  changed,  nor  commented  on,  the 
original,  but  merely  re-presented  the  original  in  its  entirety,  seemed  like  a  puzzling 
one-off.  But  twenty  years  later,  with  the  arrival  of  the  digital  age,  a  wave  of  court  of 
appeals  opinions  — iParadigms , Arriba  Soft , Perfect  10 , Hathitrust ,  and Google 
5 6 7 8
Books  —  very  similarly  found  fair  use  based  on  technological  transformations  without  
9
change  or  commentary,  where  no  significant  fourth-factor  harm  to  the  original  resulted. 
Sony  now  appears  to  have  been  not  a  one-off,  but  a  farsighted  precursor.  It  has  become 
mainstream  transformative  in  conventional  fair-use  analysis.  
The TVEyes  case  arose  against  that  background.  The  plaintiff,  Fox  News,  was  the 
owner  of  copyright-protected  TV  content  that  was  being  broadcast  throughout  the  United 
States.  The  defendant,  TVEyes,  was  marketing  an  ingenious  invention  that  pushed  far 
beyond  Sony’s  analog  time-shifting  technology.  For  deep-pocketed  customers  motivated 
to  be  informed  of  everything  that  appeared  on  TV  throughout  the  nation  dealing  with 
some  particular  subject  matter  of  interest  to  them,  TVEyes  offered  its  subscribers  (at  an 
expensive  price)  digital  technology  to  accomplish  that  by  a  system  that  utilized  TV’s 
closed  captioning. 
On  the  defendant’s  website,  a  subscriber  who  wanted  to  know  everything  being 
said  on  TV  about  Tylenol,  could  type  the  word  “Tylenol”  into  the  search  box,  and 
instantly  the  site  would  reveal  a  minute’s  worth  of  closed  captioning  surrounding  every 
televised  mention  of  Tylenol  throughout  the  United  States.  Then,  by  clicking  on  a  link, 
the  subscriber  could  watch  an  extendable  ten  minutes  of  the  original  TV  transmission. 
This  enabled  the  defendant’s  customers  at  any  convenient  moment  to  watch  transmissions 
that  would  not  have  been  accessible  in  their  home  locations.  The  service  thus  included 
not  only  the  time-shifting  capability  that  was  offered  by  Sony  but,  in  addition,  it  made  all 
of  the  nation’s  TV  markets  accessible  on  the  customer’s  computer  and  targeted  the 
precise  minute  of  broadcast  that  is  of  interest  to  the  subscriber.  This  was  unquestionably  a 
huge  technological  efficiency  enhancement. 
Nonetheless,  the  court  of  appeals  rejected  fair  use.  A  big  difference  between  this 
case  and Sony  was  that  the  defendant’s  customers  and  TVEyes’  customers  did  not  own 
the  right  to  watch  the  plaintiff’s  transmissions.  The  defendant  was  selling  a  competing 
substitute  and  in  doing  so  inflicting  significant  fourth-factor  harm. 
5  A.V.  ex  rel.  Vanderhye  v.  iParadigms,  LLC,  562  F.3d  630  (4th  Cir.  2009).  
6  Kelly  v.  Arriba  Soft  Corp.,  336  F.3d  811  (9th  Cir.  2003).  
7  Perfect  10,  Inc.  v.  Amazon.com,  Inc.,  508  F.3d  1146  (9th  Cir.  2007).  
8  Authors  Guild,  Inc.  v.  HathiTrust,  755  F.3d  87  (2nd  Cir.  2014). 
9  Authors  Guild  v.  Google,  Inc.,  804  F.3d  202  (2nd  Cir.  2015). 
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So  what  was  the  precedential  landscape  for  a  controversy  that  pits  a  copying  that 
delivers  big  technological  enhancement  in  accessibility  and  utility  of  the  plaintiff’s 
transmissions  against  a  substantial  fourth-factor  harm? 
The  Supreme  Court  had  asserted  emphatically  in The  Nation  that  the  fourth  
10
factor  is  “undoubtedly  the  single  most  important  element  of  fair  use.”  Then Campbell , 
while  stating  that  all  four  factors  have  to  be  balanced  together,  did  not  contradict The 
Nation ’s  assertion  of  fourth-factor  dominance. 
My  court’s  ruling  in Google  Books  reinforced  it.  While  we  found  fair  use  in  a 
powerful  technological  tool  that  assisted  researchers  in  identifying  the  books  that  were 
responsive  to  their  interests  (while  not  allowing  users  to  read  the  books),  we  made  clear 
in dictum  that  we  would  have  found  infringement  if  the  technology  had  allowed  them  to 
read  the  books.  There  would  have  been  infringement  notwithstanding  the  powerful 
transformative  technology. 
The TVEyes  decision  reinforces  the  comparative  dominance  of  the  fourth  factor, 
whose  recognition  might  have  slipped  somewhat  in  the  aftermath  of Campbell ’s 
anointing  of  the  significance  of  transformativeness.  Statistical  studies  in  the  last  decade 
have  suggested  that  transformativeness  might  have  acquired  excessive  importance  in 
adjudications.  I  certainly  do  not  deny  the  importance  of  transformativeness.  It  may  well 
be  essential  to  a  finding  of  fair  use.  
But  transformativeness  cannot  guarantee  fair  use.  The  first  and  fourth  factors 
must  be  balanced,  but  the  fourth  factor  is  dominant.  Copyright  prizes  protecting  the 
author’s  entitlement  to  profit  from  her  writings.  The TVEyes  ruling  helps  to  restore 
fourth-factor  priority,  if  it  was  ever  in  doubt. 
In  conclusion,  the TVEyes  decision  invites  a  very  interesting  question:  What 
would  the  result  have  been  if  the  defendant  had  offered  its  service  only  to  customers  who 
purchased  authorized  access  to  the  TV  content?  If  those  had  been  the  terms  of  the 
defendant’s  offer,  the  case  would  be  difficult  to  distinguish  from  Sony . 
On  the  other  hand,  Professor  Ginsburg  has  pointed  out  to  me  that,  if Sony ’s  facts 
were  presented  today,  in  a  marketplace  where  the  content  owners  (or  their  licensees)  are 
selling  their  customers  the  time-shifting  technology  that  provided  fair-use  justification  for 
Sony’s  Betamax,  the  fair-use  analysis  might  come  to  the  opposite  conclusion,  like  the 
TVEyes  opinion.  
Thank  you. 
MR.  RUSSELL:  Judge  Leval,  in  the TCA  case,  do  you  have  any  thoughts  on  why 
it  was  important  for  the  Second  Circuit  to  clarify  the  bounds  and  meaning  of 
transformativeness,  given  the  posture  of  the  case  with  the  court  below  finding  that  the 
copyright  had  lapsed  but  yet  still  weighing  in  on  clarifying  that? 
JUDGE  LEVAL:  I  can’t  answer  that.  You  are  correct  that  it  could  all  be 
characterized  as dictum  because  the  case  was  decided  on  an  entirely  different  basis,  but 
fair  use  had  been  vigorously  argued.  I  don’t  know  what  went  on  in  the  workings  of  the 
panel,  but  I  am  glad  they  did  it  because  I  think  the  discussion  was  a  valuable  clarification 
of  law  regardless  of  whether  it  is  in  dictum . 
10  Harper  &  Row  Publishers,  Inc.  v.  Nation  Enterprises,  471  U.S.  539  (1985). 
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MR.  RUSSELL:  With  the TVEyes  case,  you  also  mentioned  its  reference  to Sony 
Betamax  and  that  being  a  transformative  case,  and  you  thought  it  was,  and  the  majority 
agreed  with  that  as  well,  but  then  Judge  Kaplan  seemed  to  call  that  into  question. 
Terry,  do  you  have  any  thoughts  on  the Sony  Betamax  case  and  its 
transformativeness? 
MR.  HART:  Yes.  I  thought  it  was  an  interesting  discussion  that  came  up,  and  I 
know  Judge  Leval  in  a  later  decision  reinforced  the  idea  that Sony  was  transformative, 
even  though  the  decision  itself  had  come  out  prior  to  the Campbell  decision  where  the 
Supreme  Court  first  adopted  the  notion  of  transformativeness. 
In  a  concurrence,  Judge  Kaplan  questions  this  — Wait.  When  did  Sony  become 
transformative?  This  is  just  kind  of  wholesale  copying.  Yes,  it’s  being  done  for  a  purpose 
that  is  recognized  as  a  fair  use,  but  it  seems  to  be  a  non-transformative  purpose  —  and  he 
cites  a  number  of  other  cases  where  this  kind  of  copying  was  taking  place. 
I  think  you  also  see  in  the  fair-use  statute  itself,  in  the  preamble  where  it  is  listing 
the  types  of  uses  that  might  be  considered  fair  use,  certainly  criticism  and  commentary 
would  fall  into  that  transformative  bucket;  but  then  there  are  other  types  of  uses  — 
reproduction  in  libraries,  reproduction  for  classroom  uses  —  where  it  is  a  fair  use  but 
there  is  not  really  anything  changing  as  far  as  the  work  goes;  it  is  just  being  copied  for 
convenience  or  for  utility.  I  think,  if  I  understand  Judge  Leval’s  point,  that  that  additional 
utility  makes  it  transformative,  and  perhaps  that’s  what  transformativeness  means. 
But  I  think  there  is  also  some  usefulness  to  distinguishing  between 
transformative  fair  uses  and  non-transformative  fair  uses  so  as  to  maybe  provide  a  bit 
more  guidance  to  other  judges  out  there  who  are  considering  new  types  of  fact  patterns  or 
new  types  of  technological  uses,  who  don’t  have  just  “is  this  is  transformative  or  is  this 
not?”  They  can  sit  down  and  say:  “What  is  this  doing?  What  is  it  most  analogous  to? 
Does  this  line  up  with  what  we  would  consider  traditional  fair  uses  whether  in  the 
transformativeness  bucket  or  the  non-transformativeness  bucket.” 
MR.  RUSSELL:  I  can  see  that  the  Second  Circuit  in  choosing  to  clarify  the  role 
and  balance  of  transformativeness  is  trying  to  provide  guidance,  which  is  often  in 
question  sometimes,  at  least  nationally. 
Any  other  thoughts  on  the  TCA  case  or  deriving  from  Judge  Leval’s  presentation? 
PROF.  GOLDEN:  I  found  it  interesting  how  Judge  Leval  suggested  that,  in  the 
cases,  transformativeness  might  be  necessary  but  that  the  fourth  factor  was  primary.  Can 
you  elaborate  on  what  you  mean  by  that?  If  transformative,  at  least  to  some  degree,  is 
necessary  —  you  could  say  it  is  a  threshold  issue;  it  has  to  be  satisfied  —  then  couldn’t  it 
be  argued  it  would  have  to  be,  at  least  at  the  threshold,  at  least  as  important  as  the  fourth 
factor  in  some  sense? 
JUDGE  LEVAL:  Why?  Why  does  it  have  to  be  as  important  as  the  fourth  factor 
merely  because  it  is  necessary? 
PROF.  GOLDEN:  Well,  if  it  is  necessary. 
JUDGE  LEVAL:  Transformative  use  can  be  necessary  for  copying  to  be  eligible 
for  fair  use  without  guaranteeing  a  finding  of  fair  use.  A  transformative  use  is  not 
necessarily  going  to  win  because,  if  it  causes  substantial  fourth-factor  harm,  that 
fourth-factor  harm  to  the  value  of  copyright  is  going  to  prevail.  
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While  the  word  “transformative”  was  newly  applied  in Campbell ,  what  the  word 
was  doing  in Campbell ’s  analysis  was  looking  for  what  kinds  of  copying  uses  have  been 
of  the  sort  that  the  copyright  law  has  deemed  capable  of  justifying  the  copying.  The  fact 
that Sony  did  not  use  the  word  “transformative”  does  not  mean  that  it  wasn’t  thinking 
along  the  same  lines  as Campbell ,  looking  to  the  kinds  of  considerations  that  have 
justified  copying. 
MR.  RUSSELL:  Judge  Leval,  since  we  have  a  bit  of  time  for  discussion,  I  want 
to  ask  about  a  recent Stanford  Technology  Law  Review  article  that  did  an  empirical  
11
study  of  all  of  the  transformative  cases,  the  cases  that  came  after  your  famous Harvard 
Law  Review  article ,  where  they  considered  transformativeness  and  did  an  empirical 
12
study  of  those.  Two  of  the  statistics  are:  90  percent  of  all  fair  use  cases  since  1990 
involved  transformativeness  analysis  and  94  percent  of  all  cases  finding 
transformativeness  resulted  in  a  fair  use  finding.  
I  think  you  started  to  address  it,  but  how  do  you  see  the  transformativeness 
element  not  as  a  one-factor  test,  as  this  article  seems  to  suggest,  but  fitting  within  the 
other  factors? 
JUDGE  LEVAL:  The  Stanford  article  and  the  statistics  are  interesting,  and  they 
make  an  argument  that  transformativeness  has  acquired  excessive  importance.  If  such  a 
high  percentage  of  findings  of  transformativeness  result  in  a  finding  of  fair  use,  probably 
transformativeness  is  being  given  too  high  a  value.  That  may  well  be  right.  Nonetheless,  I 
think  that  there  are  considerable  problems  in  the  observations  of  the  Stanford  article.  
For  one  thing,  making  a  statistical  analysis  of  the  number  of  decisions  fails  to 
give  proper  recognition  to  the  fact  that  a  number  of  erroneous  district  court  rulings  of  the 
sort  that  I  discussed  in TCA  and TVEyes  —  either  not  getting  correct  what  should  be 
deemed  transformative  or  attaching  too  much  importance  to  it  —  have  been  largely 
corrected  by  reversals  in  the  courts  of  appeals.  I  talked  about  two.  Jane  is  going  to  talk 
about  another  later. 
The  statistical  analysis  doesn’t  consider Campbell’s  illuminating  discussion  of  the 
parody/satire  distinction,  which  restrains  repetition  of  prior  errors  counted  in  the 
statistics. 
But  another  thing  about  the  Stanford  article  that  I  think  is  truly  bizarre  is  its 
proposition  that  emphasis  on  transformativeness  has  detracted  from  emphasis  on  things 
like  commercial,  bad  faith,  and  the  second  factor.  The  reason  that  courts  don’t  much 
discuss  commercial,  bad  faith,  and  the  second  factor  is  that  they  are  not  helpful  in  the 
fair-use  analysis. 
What  transformativeness  has  done  is  that  finally,  after  generations  of  fair  use 
existing  without  precedential  guidance  as  to  what  sort  of  “purpose  and  character  of  the 
use”  is  favored,  it  has  suggested,  in  a  term  that  is  certainly  neither  precise  nor  perfect,  a 
direction  that  gives  some  understanding  to  the  first  factor.  All  the  first  factor  tells  you  is, 
“Look  at  the  purpose  and  character  of  the  use.”  But  what  purpose  and  character?  It 
doesn’t  tell  you  what  kind  of  purpose  or  character  is  helpful  to  a  finding  of  fair  use,  and 
transformativeness  is  a  nudge  in  a  direction  that  is  helpful  in  the  analysis. 
11  Jiarui  Liu,  An  Empirical  Study  of  Transformative  Use  in  Copyright  Law ,  22  Stan.  Tech. 
L.  Rev.  163  (2019).  
12  Pierre  N.  Leval,  Toward  a  Fair  Use  Standard ,  103  Harv.  L.  Rev.  1105  (1990).   
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The  Stanford  article  says  we  would  be  better  off  without  transformativeness,  if 
judges  were  just  taking  every  case  as  a  one-off  and  deciding  for  independent  reasons 
without  any  structural  framework:  “This  one  passes;  this  one  doesn’t.”  I  don’t  think  that 
is  law.  I  think  law  involves  at  least  the  attempt  to  formulate  consistent  doctrine  of 
universal  application. 
MR.  RUSSELL:  The  Supreme  Court  has  made  clear  that  all  four  of  the  factors 
are  to  be  weighed  in  the  analysis.  Any  views  on  what  place  the  second  factor  currently 
has  in  terms  of  the  nature  of  the  work? 
PROF.  GOLDEN:  The  courts  seem  a  bit  schizophrenic  on  the  second  factor. 
Sometimes,  as  in  the TCA  case  cited  by  Judge  Leval, TCA  Television  Corp.  v.  McCollum , 
you  will  see  a  court  seem  to  take  it  seriously;  but  in Fox  News  Network,  LLC  v.  TVEyes, 
Inc. ,  as  in  the  recent  Federal  Circuit  opinion  in Oracle  America,  Inc.  v.  Google  LLC ,  you  13
see  the  court  saying  that  the  second  factor  is  rarely  significant  in  the  fair-use  analysis  and 
treat  the  factor  fairly  dismissively.  Judge  Leval  has  likewise  indicated  that  it’s  not  so 
helpful. 
I  find  this  interesting.  I  am  not  sure  it  is  an  absolutely  necessary  conclusion.  To 
me  it  makes  sense,  at  least,  that  you  could  view  the  second  factor  as  significant.  I  think  it 
depends  in  part  on  how  you  think  the  fair-use  analysis  is  supposed  to  go. 
If  you  think,  as  the  Supreme  Court  suggested  in Campbell  v.  Acuff-Rose  Music, 
Inc. ,  that  you  can  identify  when  a  work  is  in  the  core  of  what  copyright  law  is  supposed 
to  protect,  you  might  say  with  respect  to  such  core  works,  “We  are  going  to  be  more 
reluctant  to  find  that  the  fair-use  balance  weighs  against  the  copyright  holder.” 
If  something  is  more  peripheral,  just  on  the  border  of  what  might  have  been 
found  to  be  copyrightable  subject  matter,  it  doesn’t  seem  crazy  to  me  to  think  that  you 
might  say,  “We  are  going  to  be  more  willing  to  find  that  the  fair-use  balance  tips  against 
copyright  protection  being  effective  in  this  case.” 
I  can  imagine  a  design  choice  either  way.  To  me,  it  certainly  can  make  sense  to 
have  the  nature  of  the  work  be  a  more  significant  factor  than  courts  sometimes  suggest.  In 
any  event,  it  is  interesting  how  the  courts  can  seem  to  treat  it  differently  from  case  to 
case. 
MR.  RUSSELL:  Anyone  else  want  to  pop  in? 
JUDGE  LEVAL:  What  I  think  has  rendered  it  insignificant  is  that  courts  always 
look  at  it,  they  always  address  it  —  because  they  are  told,  “You  should,  it’s  one  of  the 
factors”  —  again  and  again  and  again,  they  look  and  do  not  find  anything  in  it  that  helps 
them  reach  a  decision.  That’s  why  it  has  come  to  be  treated  as  insignificant.  I  don’t 
disagree  that  it  could  conceivably  be  significant  in  a  particular  case,  but  that  hardly  ever 
happens. 
MR.  RUSSELL:  Professor  Ginsburg? 
PROF.  GINSBURG:  I  think  the  second  factor  had  some  value  before  it  was  clear 
how  to  deal  with  unpublished  works.  Before  the  1976  Act,  there  were  no  cases  on  fair  use 
of  unpublished  works  because  federal  copyright  law  did  not  cover  unpublished  works. 
The Harper  &  Row  case  was  brought  largely  to  establish  the  principle  that  if  the  work  is 
13  Oracle  America,  Inc.  v.  Google  LLC,  886  F.3d  1179,  1205  (Fed.  Cir.  2018). 
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unpublished,  the  likelihood  of  a  finding  of  fair  use  substantially  diminished  because  it  is 
not  fair  to  take  the  work  out  from  under  the  author  and  publish  it  first. 
Subsequent  to  the  Supreme  Court’s  ruling  in Harper  &  Row  stressing  the 
importance  of  the  unpublished  nature  of  the  work,  lower  courts  went  a  little  overboard  in 
creating  an  absolutely  bright-line  rejection  of  fair  use.  As  a  result,  Congress  amended 
Section  107  to  specify  that  a  work’s  unpublished  status  did  not  preclude  fair  use  so  long 
as  the  other  factors  are  taken  into  account. 
Once  you  take  the  published/unpublished  nature  of  the  work  out  of  the  equation, 
I  agree  that  the  second  factor  may  not  be  doing  much  work.  The  proposition  that  the  more 
expressive  the  work  the  less  subject  it  is  to  fair  use  does  not  make  sense;  cases  involving 
parody  and  other  forms  of  criticism  or  comment  tend  to  concern  highly  expressive  works. 
If  the  work  has  a  thin  copyright  because  of  its  factual  content,  it  is  not  going  to 
get  that  much  protection  upfront  anyway.  Once  the  unpublished  nature  of  the  work  is  no 
longer  a  matter  of  considerable  discussion,  it  is  not  clear  that  the  second  factor  actually 
adds  that  much. 
MR.  RUSSELL:  Terry? 
MR.  HART:  To  build  off  what  Jane  said,  I  think  when  courts  are  going  through 
all  four  factors,  a  lot  of  what  the  second  factor  is  supposed  to  cover  is  somewhat 
redundant  with  the  other  factors.  But  if  you  are  dealing  with  a  work  that  is  not  really  at 
the  core  of  what  copyright  is  supposed  to  protect,  they  are  probably  not  going  to  see  a  lot 
of  market  harm  with  someone  copying  that.  If  it  is  like  a  student’s  test  paper,  that  will  not 
be  given  a  lot  of  weight  under  the  second  factor;  but  it  also  won’t  be  given  a  lot  of  weight 
under  the  fourth  factor.  So  it  is  kind  of  redundant. 
I  do  have  two  thoughts  about  directions  we  might  go  to  give  the  second  factor 
more  work  to  do.  One  is  troubling  and  one  might  be  promising. 
The  troubling  one  is:  If  courts  do  place  more  emphasis  on  the  expressive  nature 
of  the  work  —  and  you  see  this  sometimes  in  photography  cases,  where  they  give  short 
shrift  to  the  type  of  creative  choices  that  go  into  photography  and  say,  “Oh,  this  is  just 
someone  pointing  a  camera  at  something;  this  is  a  factual  work”  —  under  the  second  fair 
use  factor  that  tends  to  weigh  in  favor  of  fair  use.  That  weakens  the  copyright  protection 
for  a  lot  of  photographers,  specifically  photographers  who  might  be  engaged  more  in 
stock  photography  and  less  creative  fine  art  photography.  That’s  the  troublesome  avenue 
that  the  second  fair  use  factor  might  sometimes  take. 
But  I  do  think  there  might  be  some  promising  areas  for  the  second  fair  use  factor 
for  those  who  might  be  interested  in  seeing  fair  use  applied  more  broadly  and  in  more 
areas  that  are  not  really  at  the  core  of  copyright  protection  but  might  not  be  addressed 
with  limitations  and  exceptions. 
For  example,  there  was  one  proposal  in  a  law  review  article  that  suggested  the 
age  of  the  work  should  be  incorporated  into  the  second  fair  use  factor  determination  so 
that  if  a  work  is  older  but  still  protected  by  copyright,  maybe  that  will  tend  to  weigh  more 
in  favor  of  fair  use;  whereas  if  a  work  is  newer  but  it  is  still  commercially  exploited,  that 
would  weigh  less  in  favor  of  fair  use. 
You  could  think  of  maybe  not  just  the  factual  nature  of  the  work  or  the  amount  of 
creativity,  but  these  other  dimensions  of  copyrighted  works  under  the  second  fair  use 
factor  that  might  help  guide  the  fair-use  inquiry  to  get  fairer  results. 
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MR.  RUSSELL:  That  is  certainly  interesting,  especially  given  the  duration 
debates  that  we  have  had  recently. 
Judge  Leval,  do  you  want  to  close  us  out  on  this  subset  of  our  discussion? 
JUDGE  LEVAL:  I  actually  have  a  suggestion  as  to  the  utility  of  the  second 
factor,  but  I  have  never  been  able  to  get  anybody  to  pay  attention  to  it. 
The  second  factor,  in  combination  with  the  first,  recognizes  that  the  concept  of 
transformativeness  inherently  makes  a  comparison  between  the  copying  work  and  the 
copied  work.  This  is  illustrated  by TCA ,  the Who’s  on  First?  case  that  I  talked  about. 
What  was  the  nature  of  the  original?  It  was  a  funny  joke;  it  was  a  funny  routine;  its 
purpose  was  to  make  people  laugh.  That  is  the  second  factor.  What  was  the  purpose  and 
character  of  the  copying  work?  It  took  that  funny  joke  and  used  it  to  make  people  laugh 
at  the  original  joke.  That  is  a  comparison  of  the  two  works. 
So  I  think  that  the  notion  of  transformativeness,  although  generally  considered  as 
a  part  of  factor  one  analysis,  inevitably  considers  the  nature  of  the  original  together  with 
the  purpose  and  character  of  the  copying  work.  Courts  have  regularly  given  great 
importance  to  the  second  factor,  but  they  have  done  so  in  talking  about  the  first  factor. 
When  they  come  to  the  mandatory  discussion  of  the  second  factor,  there  was  nothing 
further  to  say. 
MR.  RUSSELL:  Transitioning  slightly,  just  a  slight  pivot,  there  is  a  recent  case 
out  of  the  Ninth  Circuit  on  transformativeness  of  a  photo  search  engine.  Terry  had 
mentioned  photography  and  perhaps  different  treatment  there. 
Professor  Ginsburg,  do  you  want  to  give  us  a  summary  of  your  views  of  this  new 
case  out  of  the  Ninth  Circuit? 
PROF.  GINSBURG:  I  would  first  like  to  step  back  to  make  some  broader 
observations  to  set  the  context  of  that  Ninth  Circuit  decision.  In  addition,  the  Fourth 
Circuit  today  handed  down  its  decision  in  another  fair  use  case, Brammer  v.  Violent  Hues 
. 
14
Both  of  these  cases  are  examples  of  the  kinds  of  cases  that  Judge  Leval  was 
talking  about:  in Brammer ,  a  case  that  was  not  a  technological  fair-use  pretender;  and  in 
the  Ninth  Circuit’s VHT  v  Zillow  decision,  a  case  which  was  a  technological  fair-use  
15
pretender. 
Over  the  years,  transformative  use  has  been  broken  down  into  two  different  kinds 
of  transformation.  One  kind  of  transformation  concerns  new  works:  has  the  defendant 
created  a  new  work  which  transforms  the  copied  material?  The  other  kind  concerns  new 
purposes:  is  the  purpose  of  the  work  —  which  might  have  been  copied  in  its  entirety  —a 
purpose  that  gives  new  meaning  or  message  to  that  work?  These  two  types  of 
transformativeness  implicate  different  analyses. 
A  great  copyright  litigator,  Dale  Cendali,  has  encapsulated  the  difference  in  two 
particularly  apt  aphorisms.  
With  respect  to  the  “new  work”  sort  of  transformation,  she  asks:  “Did  the 
defendant  take  too  much  and  do  too  little  with  it?”  The TCA case  nicely  exemplifies  the 
application  of  that  aphorism.  Defendants  took  the  entire  “Who’s  on  first?”  routine  and 
14  Brammer  v.  Violent  Hues  Productions,  LLC,  922  F.3d  255  (4th  Cir.  2019).  
15  VHT,  Inc.  v.  Zillow  Group,  Inc.,  918  F.3d  723  (9th  Cir.  2019). 
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basically  didn’t  do  anything  with  it;  they  took  it  for  the  same  purpose  as  the  original 
work,  even  if  putting  the  routine  verbatim  in  a  different  context  might  have  given  it  a 
slightly  different  cast. 
The  other  aphorism  neatly  summarizes  the  appropriate  inquiry  for  technological 
fair  use  cases.  Dale  Cendali  inquires  whether  the  defendant’s  purpose  is  “finding  or 
delivering”  copyrightable  expression.  What  may  be  fair  use  as  to  finding  is  not 
necessarily  fair  use  as  to  delivering.  In  focusing  on  delivery,  a  court  asks,  What  is  the 
output? 
TVEyes  offers  a  good  example  of  the  distinction:  the  search  aspect  of TVEyes  — 
that  is,  copying  for  the  purpose  of  indexing  all  the  television  clips  —ultimately  was  not  at 
issue  in  the  case.  Rather,  the  question  was  whether  what  was  delivered  —  ten  minutes  of 
output  —  was  too  much;  ten  minutes,  moreover,  for  essentially  the  same  purpose  as  the 
original  clips  (most  of  which  lasted  well  under  ten  minutes).  Focusing  on  the  output,  on 
what  is  being  delivered,  may  rein  in  a  number  of  technological  fair  use  claims. 
The  Ninth  Circuit’s Zillow  case  illustrates  this  analysis.  The  case  involved  a 
claim  by  VHT,  a  photo  service,  against  Zillow.  Zillow  has  a  database  of  images  of  real 
estate  and  another  database  called  Digs  that  shows  interiors  of  the  houses  that  are  on  the 
Zillow  database. 
It  is  not  entirely  clear  how  the  pictures  got  into  Zillow’s  listings  in  the  first  place 
—  if  they  were  licensed,  but  not  for  the  Digs  site  —  nonetheless,  Zillow  then  indexed  all 
those  images  in  order  to  allow  them  to  come  up  in  the  search  for  Digs. 
When  the  copyright  owner  of  those  photographs  claimed  that  use  was  not 
authorized,  Zillow  retorted  that  its  use  was  per  se  fair  because  Zillow  is  a  search  engine. 
If  a  search  engine,  then  fair  use;  see  Kelly  v.  Arriba ,  see  Perfect  10 ,  see  Google  Books . 
Ninth  Circuit  Judge  Margaret  McKeown  demurred:  “It  does  not  suffice  to  assert 
‘I’m  a  search  engine,  end  of  question.’”  Rather,  she  looked  at  the  output  of  the  searches. 
She  distinguished  prior  search  engine  cases  in  which  the  output  was  a  non-substitutional 
thumbnail  photo;  or,  as  in Google  Books ,  where  the  output  was  either  no  expression  at  all 
or  merely  “snippets”  which  were  not  substitutional  and  indeed  could  not  be  cumulated 
into  a  full  page  that  might  be  substitutional  in  some  way.  So  search  is  not  the  end-all; 
what  matters  is  the  delivery.  In  the  earlier  cases  what  was  being  delivered  was  not 
substitutional.  
In  the Zillow  case,  by  contrast,  what  was  being  delivered  was  a  high-resolution, 
full-quality  photograph  which  competed  with  the  plaintiff’s  licensing  of  those 
photographs  for  uses  that  included  exactly  the  kinds  of  uses  Zillow  was  making  of  those 
photographs. 
Let’s  return  to  the Brammer  case,  which  also  involved  photographs,  but  not  a 
technological  new  use.  The  plaintiff  had  taken  a  photograph  of  the  Adams  Morgan 
neighborhood  by  night.  He  posted  it  to  Flickr  with  a  copyright  notice  “all  rights 
reserved.”  That  didn’t  seem  to  matter  to  the  defendant  in  that  case,  who  incorporated  that 
photograph  with  two  other  images  to  illustrate  local  tourist  attractions  in  connection  with 
an  arts  festival  near  Washington,  D.C. 
The  district  court  found  that  the  use  was  non-substitutional  because  it  was  an 
informational  use  of  the  photograph;  and  did  not  cause  harm  to  the  plaintiff  because  the 
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plaintiff,  even  after  this  infringement  had  occurred,  had  managed  to  engage  in  some 
licensing  of  that  same  photograph. 
The  district  court’s  opinion  proves  Judge  Leval’s  point  that  looking  at  the  total 
number  of  transformative  use  cases  may  be  misleading  because  appellate  courts  correct 
some  fairly  grave  errors  of  the  lower  courts.  In Brammer ,  the  appellate  court  did  not  find 
that  the  use  was  transformative.  The  court  distinguished  cases  where  the  work  — 
essentially  the  entire  photograph  —  was  being  used  for  technological  purposes  or  for 
documentary  purposes;  neither  of  which  was  true  in  the  Brammer  case. 
The  Fourth  Circuit  in  rejecting  the  characterization  of  the  use  as  informative,  and 
therefore  transformative,  stated:  “Such  a  use  does  not  necessarily  create  a  new  function  or 
meaning  that  expands  human  thought.  If  this  were  so,  virtually  all  illustrative  uses  of 
photography  will  qualify  as  transformative.  That  can’t  be  right.” 
On  the  fourth  factor,  the  district  court  effectively  ruled  that  if  the  defendant  did 
not  entirely  destroy  the  plaintiff’s  market  by  making  an  unlicensed  use,  then  the  fourth 
factor  favors  the  defendant.  The  Fourth  Circuit  rebuked:  “That  cannot  be  correct.  If  the 
mere  fact  of  subsequent  sales  serves  to  defeat  a  claim  of  market  harm,  then  commercially 
successful  works  could  hardly  ever  satisfy  this  factor.” 
If  some  district  courts  may  be  going  a  little  bit  off  the  rails,  nonetheless,  as  Judge 
Leval  indicated,  there  does  seem  to  be  a  salutary  corrective  tendency  in  the  courts  of 
appeals  to  rein  in  some  of  the  excesses  of  transformative  use. 
MR.  RUSSELL:  There’s  a  ton  we  could  say.  This  is  not  a  transformativeness 
panel;  it  is  a  broader  fair  use  panel.  I’m  hoping  to  use  our  time  to  branch  out  into  some 
other  aspects. 
Putting  things  together  a  bit,  Professor  Golden,  why  don’t  you  say  a  little  bit 
about  the  relationship  between  fair  use  and  other  limiting  doctrines? 
PROF.  GOLDEN:  This  is  related  a  little  bit  to  our  earlier  interchange  on  what  the 
significance  of  the  second  factor  could  be.  
I  think  it  is  a  potential  issue  for  the  Supreme  Court  in  the Oracle  v.  Google  case, 
where  in  the  current  petition  they  are  asked  to  look  at  issues  of  copyrightability  and  fair 
use.   16
At  the  Federal  Circuit  level,  we  saw  the  Federal  Circuit  trying  to 
compartmentalize  various  copyright  doctrines,  as  it  often  has  done  with  patent  law 
doctrines,  sometimes  with  positive,  clarifying  effect.  A  lot  of  patent  law  doctrine  is  more 
comprehensible  than  it  was  when  the  regional  circuits  were  dealing  with  it  in  the  1970s. 
I  think  this  is  an  area  where  we  can  have  a  fundamental  battle  regarding  the 
extent  to  which  you  allow  some  redundancy  between  legal  doctrines.  Functionality  can 
be  significant  at  the  stage  of  wondering  about  copyrightable  subject  matter;  and  then 
there  can  be  a  question  of  how  significant  functionality  or  functional  aspects  of  a  work 
should  be  in  the  fair-use  analysis,  whether  through  the  second  factor,  the  functional 
nature  of  a  work  such  as  software,  or  through  the  other  factors,  even  if  you  do  not  think 
the  second  factor  has  much  independent  force.   17
16  Petition  for  a  Writ  of  Certiorari  at  (I),  Google  LLC  v.  Oracle  America,  Inc.,  No.  18-956 
(Jan.  24,  2019). 
17  Cf.  Oren  Bracha  &  John  M.  Golden,  Redundancy  and  Anti-Redundancy  in  Copyright , 
51  C ONN .  L.  R EV .  (forthcoming  2019). 
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Google’s  petition  suggests  both  arguments,  as  you  might  expect,  noting  that  the 
second  factor  favored  a  finding  of  fair  use  and  also  contending  that  the  Federal  Circuit 
erred  in  not  considering  the  significance  of  the  functionality  of  software  throughout  its 
fair-use  analysis.   18
I  think  fair  use  is  sometimes  viewed  as  sort  of  a  cure-all  for  all  concerns  about 
copyright,  with  an  implication  being  that  we  do  not  need  an  improper  appropriation 
doctrine  or  a  copyrightable  subject  matter  doctrine  being  vigorously  applied  in  order  to 
protect  us  from  overreaching  copyright. 
I  tend  to  think  there  is  value  in  having  redundancy  here,  but  if  the  Supreme  Court 
grants certiorari ,  we  might  see  the  extent  of  redundancy  between  doctrines  of 
copyrightability  and  fair  use  fought  over  and  maybe  clarified. 
MR.  RUSSELL:  Very  quickly,  given  the Google  v.  Oracle  case  and  the  fact  that  it 
was  sent  to  the  jury  and  then  JNOV ,  how  do  you  view  the  role  of  judges  and  juries  in 
19
the  fair  use  space? 
PROF.  GOLDEN:  That’s  an  interesting  question.  I  would  really  be  more 
interested  in  what  practicing  judges  or  practitioners  who  have  dealt  with  juries  in  these 
cases  view  as  the  better  way  to  go. 
David  Nimmer  has  highlighted  the  fact  that  when  we  look  at  all  the  big  fair-use 
cases  in  the  past,  they  have  all  been  ones  where  a  judge  was  the  initial  decision  maker, 
whether  it  was  because  the  case  involved  a  bench  trial,  because  the  relevant  trial-level 
decision  occurred  on  summary  judgment,  or  at  a  preliminary  injunction  stage  of 
proceedings,  or  otherwise.   20
He  characterizes Oracle  v.  Google  as  “perhaps  the  most  famous”  fair-use  case 
where  we  had  a  jury  trial.  He  suggests  that  there  might  be  a  trend  toward  using  jury  21
trials  more,  in  part  because  of  some  of  the  decisions  of  the  Second  Circuit  which  have 
highlighted  factual  questions  that  can  be  raised  through  a  dispute  over  fair  use.   22
To  me,  if  you  look  at  our  general  Seventh  Amendment  law,  when  there  are 
genuine  issues  of  material  fact  in  dispute,  it  seems  a  jury  is  a  natural  place  where  fair-use 
analysis  could  end  up. 
On  the  other  hand,  as  a  practical  matter  —  and  this  is  highlighted  in  David 
Nimmer’s  analysis  —  often  these  issues  are  dealt  with  more  at  the  summary  judgment  or 
the  injunction  stage.   23
Again,  I  would  be  interested  in  the  perspective  of  people  who  have  dealt  with  this 
in  practice,  in  their  sense  of  the  utility  of  juries  and  whether  we  are  likely  to  see  juries 
become  more  prominent. 
MR.  RUSSELL:  Perhaps  we  can  talk  more  about  this  if  we  have  time  at  the  end, 
unless  we  can  bring  the  wine  and  cheese  into  the  room  for  the  reception. 
PROF.  GOLDEN:  Maybe  offline. 
18  Petition,  supra  note  16,  at  23–24. 
19  Judgment  notwithstanding  the  verdict.  
20  See  David  Nimmer,  Juries  and  the  Development  of  Fair  Use  Standards ,  31  H ARV .  J.L. 
&  T ECH .  563,  565–67  (2018). 
21  Id.  at  596. 
22  See  id. 
23  See  id.  at  566–67. 
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MR.  RUSSELL:  Can  we  do  that?  Wine  and  cheese?  No. 
To  transition  to  Silke  —  sorry  to  keep  you  out,  but  we  were  trying  to  lay  the 
groundwork  —  from  an  international  European  perspective,  do  you  want  all  this 
craziness?  Is  this  some  fun? 
MS.  VON  LEWINSKI:  Indeed  I’m  quite  an  alien  on  this  panel,  I  guess,  because  I 
am  not  an  expert  on  fair  use  at  all,  which  is  a  U.S.  concept  and  which  always  sounded  to 
me  quite  mysterious,  and  I  still  have  the  same  impression  even  after  this  panel.  But  I  am 
talking  about  this  topic  because,  as  you  know,  there  have  been  many  activities  to  try  to 
export  fair  use  to  other  countries  of  the  world.  
Some  fifteen  years  ago,  or  around  that  time,  I  observed  in  Germany  and  Europe 
all  of  a  sudden  many  of  my  colleagues,  academics,  would  ventilate  the  idea  of 
introducing  fair  use  in  our  legislation.  Many  instead  also  spoke  of  a  “flexibilization”  of 
our  limitations,  which  are  usually  shaped  as  precise  limitations  of  exclusive  rights.  They 
proposed  to  make  them  more  flexible  and  introduce  more  open  clauses.  
I  then  wondered, Where  does  this  come  from  all  of  a  sudden,  out  of  the  blue?  It 
does  not  fit  our  legal  system,  which  provides  for  quite  precise  limitations,  since  we 
consider  it  important  to  know  what  is  allowed  and  what  is  not  allowed. 
Actually,  I  only  understood  what  had  happened  when  I  came  to  Fordham  some 
years  later.  So,  sometimes,  if  you  want  to  know  what  is  going  on  in  your  own  country  you 
have  to  come  to  Fordham. 
Actually,  it  was  Bill  Patry  of  Google,  who  I  am  missing  today  on  this  panel,  who 
at  the  Fordham  Conference  at  that  time  said  something  like, Well,  we  are  quite  satisfied 
that  more  and  more  countries  are  adopting  fair  use. Actually,  we  don’t  insist  on  naming  it 
fair  use,  but  we  would  also  be  fine  with  a  flexible  approach,  having  flexible  limitations . 
At  that  moment,  I  thought,  Okay,  I  understand  where  it  comes  from . 
I  even  understood  it  better  more  recently  when  the  Google  Transparency  Project 
published  its  report Google’s  Academic  Influence  in  Europe ,  which  you  can  read  on  the 
Internet.  24
And  these  activities  are  going  on,  as  I  experienced  at  a  conference  organized  by 
the  Korean  government,  where  the  representative  of  Google  promoted  fair  use  on  several 
occasions  also  outside  the  official  program.  
Well,  okay,  it  is  going  on.  But  in  Germany  we  recently  resisted!  Last  year  a  new 
law  amending  the  Copyright  Act  entered  into  force.  The  plan  of  the  coalition  agreement 
of  the  political  parties  was  to  restructure  all  the  existing  limitations  on  research, 
education,  and  libraries,  etc.,  by  a  “global  limitation”  thereon.  Nobody  knew  what  this 
was  supposed  to  be,  so  there  was  a  lot  of  discussion  going  on.  Most  academics  still 
proposed  to  have  open  clauses,  some  kind  of  flexible  limitations,  like  the  legal  opinion 
made  for  the  Ministry  of  Research  by  an  academic  who  proposed  a  mix  of  some  precisely 
drafted  limitations  and  opening  clauses.  However,  the  competent  Ministry  of  Justice,  after 
consideration  of  all  views,  in  the  end  decided  to  choose,  in  line  with  our  legal  system  and 
tradition,  as  it  stated  in  the  legislative  motives,  the  possibly  most  precise  descriptions  of 
permitted  uses  in  the  law. 
24  Google  Transparency  Project,  Google’s  Academic  Influence  in  Europe  (March  2018), 
https://www.googletransparencyproject.org/articles/googles-academic-influence-in-europe .  
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The  legislative  motives  added  reasons  for  that  choice;  for  example,  that  in  case  of 
a  general  clause  on  limitations,  it  needs  to  be  concretized,  rendered  more  precise,  in  order 
to  know  what  is  allowed  and  what  is  not  allowed  by  law.  This  process  would  take,  of 
course,  years  and  years  of  litigation,  so  that  for  a  long  time  users  would  not  know  what  is 
allowed  and  right  owners  would  have  to  litigate,  which  is  very  costly.  In  addition,  the 
legislative  motives  explicitly  referred  to  the  example  of  the Google Books  case,  which 
also  took  a  long  time. 
I  personally  could  add  more  reasons.  In  particular,  our  constitution  provides  for 
the  fundamental  right  of  property,  which  also  covers  copyright,  and  according  to  which  it 
is  up  to  the  legislators  (rather  than  the  judges)  to  determine  the  contents  and  the 
limitations  of  the  property  right.  There  is  thus  the  question  of  competence  between  the 
legislature  and  the  judiciary,  of  separation  of  powers.  Our  constitution  actually  would 
forbid  us,  I  think,  from  having  fair  use  or  any  kind  of  too-flexible  clauses  as  limitations. 
Plus,  if  you  want  to  apply  criminal  law  in  the  case  of  infringement,  it  is  required 
to  have  precise  provisions;  otherwise,  criminal  law  could  not  be  applied. 
Plus,  in  Germany  we  have  a  lot  of  statutory  licenses  combined  with  statutory 
remuneration  rights,  such  as  the  private-copy  remuneration  and  many  others.  So,  in  the 
context  of  limitations,  the  law  provides  that  the  author  should  at  least  get  some  money.  If 
you  want  to  have  such  a  system,  the  limitation  must  be  precise  because  otherwise  the 
right  owners  don’t  know  for  what  they  can  claim  money  and  would  have  to  go  through 
many  years  of  litigation  before  actually  receiving  any  money. 
And  there  are  more  good  reasons  to  avoid  fair-use  types  of  limitations,  which  I 
do  not  have  time  to  elaborate  on.  So,  in  Germany  we  retained  the  concept  of  precise 
limitations.  I  am  also  very  glad  that  the  European  Commission  in  its  proposal  for  the 
Digital  Single  Market  Directive,  which  includes  several  limitations,  also  did  so,  and  that 
the  Directive  retained  very  precise  limitations. 
My  last  point  is  that  right  now  we  have  on  the  table  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the 
European  Union  —  which  is  always  a  risk  —  a  number  of  questions  submitted  by  the 
German  Federal  Court  with  respect  to  limitations  in  the  cases Pelham , Funke  Medien  v. 
25
FRG ,  and  Spiegel  online .  
26 27
You  know  that  in  European  law  we  have  Article  5  of  the  Information  Society 
Directive ,  which  includes  a  closed  list  of  all  the  permitted  exceptions  that  Member 
28
States  may  (or  may  choose  not  to)  provide.  This  list  also  includes  many  conditions  of  the 
permitted  uses. 
Now  the  question  was  in  three  cases  submitted  to  the  Court  of  Justice  to  decide 
whether  it  would  also  be  possible  to  apply  other  limitations,  and  also  to  what  extent 
fundamental  rights  should  be  taken  into  account.  Of  course,  if  the  Court  of  Justice  would 
start  venturing  into  basing  any  limitations  directly  on  different  fundamental  rights,  and 
25  Case  C-476/17,  Pelham  GmbH  v.  Hütter,  http://curia.europa.eu. 
26  Case  C-469/17,  Funke  Medien  NRW  GmbH  v.  Bundesrepublik  Deutschland, 
http://curia.europa.eu. 
27  Case  C-516/17,  Spiegel  Online  GmbH  v.  Volker  Beck,  http://curia.europa.eu. 
28  Directive  2001/29/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  22  May  2001 
on  the  harmonisation  of  certain  aspects  of  copyright  and  related  rights  in  the  information  society, 
2001  O.J.  (L  167)  10.  
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thus  outside  of  Article  5,  one  would  possibly  end  up  with  something  like  a  very  flexible 
clause,  including  a  lack  of  legal  certainty. 
We  do  not  yet  have  the  judgment  of  the  Court  of  Justice,  but  Advocate  General 
Szpunar  has  already  rendered  opinions  on  two  of  the  three  cases  and  made  some 
statements  that  I  find  interesting  and  also  very  good.  
First,  he  says  clearly  that  the  list  in  Article  5  is  exhaustive  and  there  should  not 
be  any  additional  limitations  applied  because  otherwise  we  would  not  have  any 
harmonization.  At  the  same  time,  it  is  up  to  the  Member  States’  legislation  to  choose  how 
to  transpose  them.  He  states:  “The  balancing  of  different  rights  and  interests  is  a 
particularly  complex  exercise,  and  there  is  rarely  a  ‘one-size-fits-all’  solution.  That 
balancing  exercise  must,  in  a  democratic  society,  be  undertaken  first  of  all  by  the 
legislature,  which  embodies  the  general  interest.” 
This  seems  to  speak  in  favor  of  concrete  legislative  provisions  instead  of  basing 
any  limitations  directly  on  fundamental  rights,  which  in  my  mind  would  be  the  right 
approach. 
MR.  RUSSELL:  It  should  be  interesting  to  see  how  memes  as  an  exception 
limitation  are  analyzed.  Maybe  fair  use  is  a  better  vehicle  for  analyzing  them. 
PROF.  GINSBURG:  Silke,  isn’t  there  another  part  of  this  puzzle,  which  is  that 
the  CJEU  does  bring  in  proportionality  analysis  at  the  front  end  to  ascertain  whether  there 
has  been  a prima  facie  infringement  of,  say,  the  communication  to  the  public  right?  Thus, 
before  one  gets  to  that  closed  list  of  exceptions,  the  CJEU  has  introduced  a  certain 
amount  of  flexibility  and  unpredictability  into  deciding  what  the  scope  of  the  right  is  in 
the  first  place  by  bringing  in  proportionality  and  weighing  fundamental  rights  to 
expression,  etc. 
MS.  VON  LEWINSKI:  If  you  refer  to  all  the  criteria  invented  by  the  Court  of 
Justice  and  applied  in  a  manner  not  easily  predictable,  in  particular  as  regards  the 
communication  right,  this  is  indeed  something  that  should  never  have  happened,  and  I 
strongly  disagree  with  that  approach;  I  guess  and  hope  that  some  national  courts  at  least 
will  still  try  to  avoid,  as  far  as  possible,  this  kind  of  arguing  and  that  the  Court  of  Justice 
in  the  long  run  will  “correct”  itself. 
MR.  RUSSELL:  Who  has  a  really  short  good  question  to  close  this  out? 
QUESTION  [Richard  Pfohl,  Music  Canada]:  A  question  for  Judge  Leval.  I  want 
to  pick  up  on  the  last  point  you  made  in  your  presentation  with  respect  to  the Fox 
News/TVEyes  case.  You  queried  if  the  TVEyes  service  had  only  been  available  to  Fox 
News  subscribers,  wouldn’t  that  have  been  analogous  to  what  happened  in  the Sony 
Betamax  case?  In  that  case,  perhaps  you  would  have  had  the Sony  outcome  instead, 
because  I  think  the  idea  is  that  you  wouldn’t  have  had  a  competing  service  with  Fox 
News,  which  you  did  in  this  case. 
My  question  is  this.  I  take  your  point  that  you  wouldn’t  necessarily  be  competing 
with  an  existing  service,  but  you  would  be  competing  with  a  potential  business  model  or 
potential  business  line  that  the  rightsholders  might  want  to  use.  So  Fox  News  might  want 
to  provide  a  searchable  function,  perhaps  that  would  be  a  premium  function,  for  its 
subscribers  who  could  go  online  and  search  for  cases  on  Tylenol  or  what  have  you.  If  you 
are  applying  the  fourth  factor,  the  economic  harm,  it  seems  to  me  that  you  would  be 
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allowing  the  competitors  to  hive  off  potential  business  lines,  cannibalizing  content,  and 
preventing  further  exploitation  of  the  work  by  the  rightsholders. 
So  my  question  is:  just  because  there  is  a  vacuum  of  exploitation  at  the  moment, 
it  doesn’t  create  a  fair-use  exception  for  someone  to  walk  into,  because  you  are  still 
creating  a  potential  economic  harm  to  the  rights  holder,  right? 
JUDGE  LEVAL:  I  think  your  suggestion  is  highly  pertinent.  Of  course,  you 
could  have  made  the  same  argument  in Sony ,  and  the  Supreme  Court  came  out  the  other 
way.  Of  course,  the  Supreme  Court  didn’t  have  the  benefit  of  your  argument.  If  you  had 
been  there,  maybe  they  wouldn’t  have  said  what  they  said  and  it  wouldn’t  have  been  such 
a  far-reaching  precursor  of  what  was  to  come. 
Your  point  is  interesting.  Suppose  TVEyes  had  said  to  its  customers,  “You  can 
only  buy  from  us  the  right  to  get  what  you  own  the  right  to  watch;  if  you  like,  we  will 
buy  for  you  the  right  to  watch  it  from  the  content  owners.”  If  TVEyes  had  offered  those 
terms,  the  case  would  look  a  lot  like Sony .  On  the  other  hand,  as  Professor  Ginsburg  has 
pointed  out  to  me,  if Sony ’s  hypothetical  were  presented  in  the  context  of  today’s 
marketplace,  where  content  distributors  are  selling  time-shifting  technology, Sony might 
well  have  come  out  the  other  way  on  the  fair  use  issue. 
MR.  RUSSELL:  Thank  you.  
Unfortunately,  we  have  reached  the  end  of  our  time  together.  Thank  you  to  the 
panelists. 
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